








Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science:






Francis Bacon (1561-1626) wrote that good scientists are not like ants (mindlessly gathering data) or spiders (spinning empty theories).  Instead, they are like bees, transforming nature into a nourishing product.  This essay examines Bacon's "middle way" by elucidating the means he proposes to turn experience and insight into understanding.  The human intellect relies on "machines" to extend perceptual limits, check impulsive imaginations, and reveal nature's latent causal structure, or “forms.”  This constructivist interpretation is not intended to supplant inductivist or experimentalist interpretations, but is designed to explicate Bacon’s account of science as a collaborative project with several interdependent methodological goals.


1. A Legacy with Many Labels.  Francis Bacon wrote that the human intellect was the source of its own problems, for it "does not put to sober and sensible use the true means of help that are in man's power."​[1]​  As a result humanity is largely ignorant of the workings of nature.  But if we adopt his methods, the quality of our lives will improve.  In calling for an intellectual revolution, Bacon is hardly unique.  Every generation has reformers who proclaim that the old ways must be overthrown.  Bacon is special because his exhortations may have been heeded. Countless connections have been made (and challenged and then re-made) between the volumes written by Bacon and the explosive growth of science after the 17th C.  Here I continue this discussion by examining Bacon's bee metaphor:
Those who have handled the sciences have been either Empricists or Rationalists.  Empiricists, like ants, merely collect things and use them.  The Rationalists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves.  The middle way is that of the bee, which gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and field, but then transforms and digests it by a power of its own. (NOI.95; Urbach & Gibson, trans.)

In the process of turning nectar into honey, bees dance, sting, and build hives.  What must natural philosophers do to transform experience into understanding? Or, to refer to another famous Baconian image, what means of navigation does he propose to help us sail the channel between the Scylla of rationalism and the Charybdis of empiricism?
My interpretation of the bee metaphor is inspired by the history of two concepts central to Bacon's metaphysics. The first is machines, especially machina intellectus, or "understanding-machines" employed in the study of nature. The second is forms, especially Forma indita or "forms which are placed upon" nature during our study of her latent structure.  Prior to Bacon, machines are not just concrete contrivances but intellectual strategies and tricks as well (hence "machinations").  In the centuries to follow, forms become sheets of papers with blanks on them to be filled by particular instances.  Bacon compares the mind to an uneven mirror, endowed with the capacity to reflect and distort. While sophisticated devices, such as microscopes and telescopes, extend the limits of our fallible powers of perception, more mundane means emerge as the mightiest machines of all.  Bacon's best idea was to urge the use of the “laboratory notebook” as a means for enhancing the mind's capacity for reflection and minimizing its tendency to distortion.  For Bacon, note taking, record keeping and table making are practices which both exploit the power of the mind while respecting its limitations—and vice versa.  The concrete forms we insert between the pages of a notebook enable us to see casual forms implicit in nature; the mental scaffolding we ascend while reading these notes prompts us to construct further concrete apparatus for prompting nature into revealing further latent structure, etc.  Thus laboratory notebooks are hybrid entities, both abstract machines and concrete forms.  They are the "auxiliis veris quae in hominis potestate sunt," that help us steer a clear course as we transform lived experience into scientific knowledge and ourselves into scientific knowers. ​[2]​
This interpretation is inspired by Rossi (1984), Pérez-Ramos (1988), and Vickers (1992). These authors discuss inadequacies of traditional views of Bacon's legacy. Some herald Bacon as he who led the charge to break free from the shackles of a barren and anti-empirical Scholasticism, e.g.,  "If we must select some one philosopher as the Hero of the revolution in scientific method, beyond all doubt Francis Bacon must occupy the place of honor” (Whewell 1854).  Others praise Bacon as a pioneering inductivist who articulated the inherent rationality of the scientific method for the first time.  John Herschel and John Stuart Mill both offered versions of this view in the 19th C.  Recently it has been re-articulated by Urbach (1987) and Snyder (1999), though their readings of Bacon's "induction" are more detailed.  In contrast, there is the prevalent view that Bacon is a naïve empiricist.  Indeed, in academic circles, a "Baconian" is a mere fact collector: someone so committed to the purity of observation they assume that if you get the initial facts straight, true theories inevitably follow.  This view was promulgated by Popper and those inspired by his deductivism, e.g., "Baconian method is now only taken seriously by the most provincial and illiterate” (Lakatos 1968).
Suppose this range of readings were options on a multiple-choice exam:





As an historian, my inclination is to reject the multiple choice format, shout "none of the above," and proceed directly to a detailed examination of Bacon's original texts as testaments of a unique and complex natural philosophy.  (This would surely be the response of Vickers, Rossi, Pérez-Ramos, et al.)  But, as a philosopher inspired by Bacon, I find it handy to invoke arbitrary lists as heuristics in the project of intellectual orienteering.  One may read this essay as an argument for the addition of another label to this list, viz., D., prescient constructivist.  However, the goal of my argument is not to show that D is superior to A, B, and C.  Something like, E. all of the above (and then some), is the best answer to the question as posed.  Indeed, the virtue of the multiple-choice rhetorical strategy resides in its failure to do Bacon justice.  This failure teaches the important moral that exegetical metaphysics is not a multiple-choice endeavor.  Thus, one should read this essay as displaying the limits of any one -ism as an exhaustive and comprehensive label for Bacon’s philosophy of science.  I present a constructivist interpretation not as the clear favorite in a winner-take-all battle, but as a vantage from which we may recognize the mutually sustaining and jointly necessary character of multiple methodologies within the scientific enterprise.
2. Exegesis a la Bacon: Fill in the blanks.  To see the need for D, consider the relative merits of A-C.  An advocate of A, Popper ([1959] 1992) writes:
Bacon held that, to prepare the mind for the intuition of the true essence or nature of a thing, it has to be meticulously cleansed of all anticipations, prejudices, and ideals.  For the source of all error is the impurity of our own minds: Nature itself does not lie.  (P. 279n.)

Popper does not refer his reader to a particular aphorism, but one can find apparent support for this assessment without difficulty.  Bacon catalogs the various idols or prejudices that plague the understanding and urges his readers to renounce them in a manner akin to religious conversion:
So much for the individual kinds of idols…all of which must be rejected and renounced and the mind totally liberated and cleansed of them, so that there will be only one entrance in the kingdom of man, which is based upon the sciences, as there is into the kingdom of heaven, 'into which, except as an infant, there is no way to enter.' (NOI.68.)

However, some of the false idols we are prone to worship will be more difficult to denounce than others.  In particular,
The idols of the tribe are founded in human nature itself and in the very tribe or race of mankind.  The assertion that the human senses are the measure of things is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe.  The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it. (NOI.41.)

Perhaps the other three idols—the cave, the marketplace and the theater—may be overcome.  In theory at least, one can eliminate personal, cultural and academic biases.  But is it possible to eliminate those biases that result from the very constitution of our being?  Bacon writes that there is simply "no way" to eliminate this particular idol.  Our project should be to expose and indict the natural inclinations of the mind—and then retrain the mind to work in legitimate ways.  Bacon does not claim that we must overcome our humanity before we undertake any scientific investigations.  Rather, the process of conducting scientific inquiry transforms our humanity.  
The illusions of the mind are not excised prior to inquiry so that the senses can be free to see things in themselves, "For by itself sense is weak and prone to error, nor do instruments for amplifying and sharpening the senses do very much" (NOI.50). What we need are well-designed experiments capable of bringing into harmony the nature of our minds and the nature of the thing under investigation:
And yet every interpretation of nature which has a chance to be true is achieved by instances, and suitable and relevant experiments, in which sense only gives a judgement on the experiment, while the experiment gives a judgement on nature and the thing itself. (Ibid.)

Feyerabend (1993) notes:
Thus, when Bacon speaks of the 'unprejudiced senses' he does not mean sense-data, or immediate impressions, but reactions of a sense organ that has been rebuilt in order to mirror nature in the right way.  Research demands that the entire human being be rebuilt. (112n.)

Feyerabend is ambivalent about the current state of human affairs in the wake of our collective Baconian transformation.  Yet, for some of us at least, the scope of our vision and the extent of our material powers have increased much as Bacon said they would.
Popper ([1959] 1992) overlooks Bacon's insistence on the role played by the intermediate means in the transformation of sense-data into experience. He describes Baconian induction as “…industrious gathering of the 'countless grapes, ripe and in season', from which he expected the wine of science to flow" and as "his myth of a scientific method that starts from observation and experiment and then proceeds to theories” (279).  If we restore the grape-gathering image to its original Aphorism, Bacon explicitly denounces the myth of free-flowing theories:
 All other men, ancient and modern alike, have in the sciences drunk a simple drink like water, either running spontaneously from the understanding, or drawn up by dialectic as by pulleys from a well.  But we drink and make our toasts in a liquor which is made from great numbers of grapes, ripe grapes, ready for the vintage, gathered and cut from the stem in selected bunches, then crushed in the winepress, then refined and strained in a vessel. (NOI.123.)

Popper ignores the role of the winepress and the vat, as indispensable to the vintners in their craft as the hive is to the bees in theirs.
Popper correctly emphasizes the active role scientists must take in generating experience: 
…experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory.  We do not stumble upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream.  Rather, we have to be active: we have to 'make' our experiences. (P. 280.)

Urbach (1987) notes the parallels between Bacon and Popper, matching extracts side by side, in his account of Bacon's philosophy, portraying Bacon as a "precursor to Popper."  Given the parallels in their thinking, why did Popper not see them?  Perhaps part of Popper's problem was Bacon’s aphoristic and metaphorical style.  Metaphors make implicit claims about the nature of things being compared; making the implicit explicit is difficult.  Consider the metaphors introduced so far:
Bees use hives to transform nectar into honey.
Vintners use presses and vats to transform grapes into wine.
Scientists use ______ to transform _______ into ____________.

These metaphors make the history and philosophy of science look like a simple matter of filling in these blanks.  Fill-in-the-blank forms are powerful representational strategies in the solution of epistemic problems.  However, filling in these particular blanks is hardly a simple matter.  Perhaps one way in which Bacon is naïve is in his expectation that his reader will infallibly understand his natural philosophy from his elliptical and aphoristic writing style.​[3]​
However, while we may share some of Popper’s frustrations with Bacon, they should not lead us to adopt a dismissive stance.  The expectation that an apparent diversity may be understood if we represent it in a suitably constructed table has not gone unfulfilled.  Kuhn (1977) notes that while Bacon's philosophy did not advance the existing sciences of the 17th C. it did prompt the development of new sciences, such as chemistry.  Thus we must wait until after the 18th C. "to discover that the Baconian movement in the sciences was by no means a fraud" (137).  Mendeleev's periodic table is a fulfillment of Baconian prophecy and its construction required an antecedent faith in its possibility.  
The openness of Bacon's style may be read as an invitation to practice the method he advocates while learning about it by filling in the blanks in the metaphors and trying to make sense of apparently contradictory aphorisms.  As Schildknecht (1995) notes:
The literary form of the aphorism reflects the hypothetical character of Bacon's method, as well as the aspect of incompleteness this method is founded upon. … It appeals to the reader to play an active role in the reception of, and response to this very method.  (Pp. 32-33.)  

3. Between induction and experiment.  Let us enter into the proper spirit of Baconian exegesis and set about filling in the blanks in the bee metaphor.  In particular, let us consider multiple-choice answer B, namely, Francis Bacon was a pioneering inductivist:  
Scientists use induction to transform observations into theories.
Support for this reading may be found throughout the Novum Organum wherein Bacon stresses the importance of observation as the starting point for the gradual development of more general theories over time in accordance with his method of induction.  The first challenge to this reading has already been noted, namely that, because the senses are unreliable, induction is not performed on spontaneous observations but on deliberate experiments.  What has not been noted yet is that induction is performed on written records or tables of affirmative, negative and variable instances: “We...call the task and function of these three tables the Presenation of instances to the intellect.  After the presentation has been made, induction itself has to be put to work” (NOII.15).
	This first challenge leads to the second, namely, that the goal of induction is not theories, or propositions, but an understanding of causal processes that empowers human action: we know only insofar as we can do. For Bacon, “those two goals of man, knowledge and power, a pair of twins, are really come to the same thing, and works are chiefly frustrated by ignorance of causes” (NO-plan, p. 24).  Bacon's emphasis on action leads Perez-Ramos (1988) to conclude that,
Bacon's induction…is not confined to the realm of language as a putative vehicle for knowledge. It rather resorts to checks placed outside human discourse and belonging to human material agency, such as the inspection of certain unusual or normally unexamined phenomena, the devising of experiments, and the use and/or construction of artefacts. (Pp. 239-240.)
	
	Consider multiple-choice answer C, Bacon was an innovative experimentalist:

Scientists use material artifacts to transform natural processes into scientific phenomena.
Bacon emphasizes the role that intervention and experiment plays in his philosophy: “secrets of nature reveal themselves better through harassments applied by the arts than when they go on in their own way” (NOI.98).  We learn from “Nature constrained and vexed...when, by the art and invention of man, she is forced out of her natural state and is pressed and moulded” (NO-plan, p. 25, Urbach & Gibson trans.).  Passages supporting the experimentalist reading of Bacon abound, but this reading also faces challenges.  
First, laboratory activity, as currently conceived, cannot generate all of the instances we must consider.  Natural history should include ordinary, extraordinary & man-made phenomena.  For, “Nature exists in three states...The first state refers to the species of things, the second to prodigies, the third to artificial things. … But we are not prescribing that the three should be treated separately” (NO-outline, pp. 223-224).  While it may seem silly to devote entire sections of our natural history to “basket-making” or “street-performers” as Bacon recommends, human artifacts and activities are proper objects of scientific study. Indeed, it is not clear whether the word “experiment” as it is currently employed has a meaning Bacon would recognize.  As Jardine and Silverthorne (2000) observe, “Experienta and experimentum are used indifferently by Bacon both for the unforced observation which we might call experience and for the contrived experience which we might call an experiment” (n. 31).
The biggest challenge to the experimentalist reading is that it fails to take into account the crucial role writing plays in Bacon’s philosophy of science.  Hacking (1983) describes physical science as a “collective, human artifact” that derives from “three fundamental human interests, speculation, calculation, and experiment” (248).  This collaborative project is heir to Bacon’s multi-faceted vision.  But unless we are prepared to stretch what Hacking means by “calculation” to include all scientific record-keeping activities, a vital collaborative element is left out of his account.​[4]​  My goal here is not to take sides, Hacking vs. Feyerabend, with respect to whether, “There have been important observations in the history of science, which have included no theoretical assumptions at all” (176).  Rather, my goal is to note Bacon’s insistence that significant and important observations are only possible after records have been made: 
But even when you have available and ready the stock and material of natural history and experience necessary...the intellect is still quite unable to work on the material on its own and by memory; ... no written experience has yet been developed, though we should not approve any discovery unless it is in writing.  When it shall come into use, we may expect more from experience finally made literate. (NOI.101.)

Neither multiple-choice answer B or C will do on its own, for induction & experiment must be pursued concurrently:
Scientists use material devices to transform natural processes into literate experience.  
Scientists use induction to transform literate experience into an understanding of causal processes.

Bridging the gap between induction and experiment raises further questions: What material devices turn natural processes into literate experiences? The experimental process clearly informs the inductive—but how does the inductive inform the experimental? How do texts help us better understand causal processes?  In the remainder of this essay, I consider the powerful cognitive role played by laboratory notebooks as the key to unlocking these questions.
4. Bacon as Prescient Constructivist.  Following Urbach’s rhetorical strategy, we can represent Bacon as a “precursor to Latour” by comparing extracts from both philosophers.  Both Bacon and Latour stress the need to pay attention to the mundane.  Bacon warns his reader not to overlook the commonplace:
…we find that the greatest obstacle to the progress of philosophy has been that familiar things of frequent occurrence do not arrest and hold men’s contemplation; they are barely noticed in passing, and no inquiry is made as to their causes. We more often need to pay attention to known things than to get information about unknown things. (NOI.119.)

Latour (1990) reminds those who write explanations in history and philosophy of science that,
...the most powerful explanations ... are the ones that take writing and imaging craftsmanship into account. They are both material and mundane, since they are so practical, so modest, so pervasive, so close to the hands and the eyes that they escape attention. (P. 21.)

Both Bacon and Latour contrast the relative impotence of the mind on its own with the enormous potential of the assisted mind.  According to Bacon, “…my method of scientific discovery leaves only a small role to sharpness and power of wits, but puts all wits and understandings more or less on a level” (NOI.61, Urbach & Gibson, trans.).  The mind must be regulated by well-devised machines: 
There remains one hope of salvation, one way to good health: that the entire work of the mind be started over again; and from the very start the mind should not be left to itself, but be constantly controlled (perpetuo regatur); and the business done (if I may put it this way) by machines (per machinas). (NO-preface, p. 28.)​[5]​

Bacon continues by comparing the power of our hands to that of our minds: How little would we accomplish if we used our bare hands alone?  How much more powerful will our knowledge of the world be if we use more than our bare minds?  Latour chastises scholars for falsely extolling our cognitive endowments while neglecting our socially constituted habits of representation:
 The role of the mind has been vastly exaggerated, as has been that of perception. An average mind...with the same perceptual abilities, within normal social conditions, will generate totally different output depending on whether his or her average skills apply to the confusing world or to inscriptions. (Op. cit. p. 47.)

Constructivists will surely welcome my portrayal of the laboratory notebook as a concrete means of making experience literate.  But perhaps not all who ally themselves with science studies will welcome the further claims I make on Bacon’s behalf.  Scientists do not use laboratory notebooks to transform instances of experience into texts, but into axioms of understanding.  Notebooks, journal articles, citations, and other “inscriptions” are not the telos of science.  Instead, notebooks are links between instances and axioms.  They enable us to reason back and forth between them, i.e., they provide traversable paths.  Bacon’s philosophy requires that we reason from particular to general and back again:  “For the road is not flat, but goes up and down—up first to the axioms, then down to the effects” (NOI.103).  Intermediate axioms are the most important:
 For the lowest axioms are not far from bare experience. And the highest axioms…are conceptual and abstract, and have no solidity.  It is the intermediate axioms which are the true, sound, living axioms on which human affairs and human fortunes rest…. (NOI.104.)

Tables of instances enable understanding because their formal structure (eventually) reflects the structure of latent causal processes, provided we undertake the unending journey back and forth between instance and axioms.  Thus, we may understand tables as Forma indita:
The task and purpose of human Power is to generate and superinduce on a given body a new nature or natures.  The task and purpose of human Science is to find for a given nature its Form,…or causative nature…. [To these tasks] is subordinate the discovery...of the continuous hidden process from the manifest Efficient cause and the observable matter to the acquired Form. (NOII.1.)

Thus, Bacon is a link in an etymological chain that stretches from the Platonic Forms of Antiquity to the pervasive forms of contemporary life, namely, those ubiquitous pieces of paper with blanks on them. The OED describes Bacon’s link as a “modification of the Scholastic use: The real or objective conditions on which a sensible quality or body depends for its existence, and the knowledge of which enables it to be freely produced.”  The first instance of “form” as a “formulary document with blanks for the insertion of particulars” is quoted from Dickens (1855).
Part II of the Novum Organum concludes with a discussion of instances, and how they are to be arranged in tables so that their significance may be perceived.  He offers a specific and detailed list of questions we must ask.  Each question corresponds to a blank that must be filled:
[By] latent process…we do not mean actual measures, signs or stages of a process which are visible in bodies, but a wholly continuous process which for the most part escapes the senses.
…we have to ask what is lost and disappears; what remains and what accrues; what expands and what contracts; what is combined, what is separated; what is continuous, what interrupted; what impels, what obstructs; what prevails, what submits; and several other questions. (NOII.6.)

This list of questions is a partial and preliminary rendering of the blanks our notebooks should contain when we investigate a particular phenomenon; the list of blanks will be modified as our investigation continues and we continue our back and forth revisionist journey.
Bacon provides examples of tables indicating ostensively the form he thinks our written experience should take.  The connection between notebooks, or collections of tables, and the machines that aid our investigations is implicit.  According to Bacon, the problem with the scholars of the past is that the ancients
…thought it a waste of time and trouble to publish their notes on particulars and their notebooks (codicillos) and treatises; and thus did what men do in building, namely after the completion of the building, remove the scaffolding (machinas) and ladders from sight. (NOI.125.)

I conjecture that Bacon would have articulated something like my laboratory notebook thesis explicitly had he completed the Great Renewal as planned.  In particular, the fourth part was going to continue the discussion of instances begun in the second part.  But alas, the fourth part was never completed:
...those portions which I have published [are] … but a kind of writing mixed of natural history and a rude and imperfect intellectual machinery (machina intellectus); …Next therefore will come the fourth part itself; wherein will be shown many examples of this machine, more exact and more applied to the rules of induction. (Spedding 1861-1874, vol. 7, p. 532.) 

	In conclusion, how might a constructivist fill in the blanks in the bee metaphor?
Scientists use abstract intellectual strategies manifest in the concrete forms of laboratory notebooks to transform instances of experience (including instances of notebook-reading) into axioms that reveal the latent causal structure of the world & empower scientists to reproduce natural processes. 
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^1	 Bacon ([1620] 1994) Novum Organum, p. 3.  All subsequent passages from this book, abbreviated NO, are taken from the Jardine and Silverthorne translation unless otherwise noted.
^2	  Whether a particular record of experience is a “laboratory notebook” depends on how it’s produced and how it’s read.  A field journal, kept by a naturalist in a bird blind, is a “laboratory notebook” if it is constructed with forethought regarding what gets recorded; specifically, the data recorded must fill in the blanks specified by the scientific community for which the record is intended.  A spontaneous and personal diary of observations as they occur to the observer is not.  The notebook must also be read as sanctioning theoretical inferences.  A more detailed discussion of sanction and spontaneity are needed to make “laboratory notebook” precise.  For now, I presume such a discussion could be developed elsewhere and focus my attention on Bacon.
^3	 Bacon is clearly naïve is in his expectation that, once his Instauration secures financial backing, scientists will discern the causes of all natural processes in a few years.  He compares the diversity of natural processes to the diversity of written expressions possible in language: just as the latter results from the combination of a small number of letters, the former results from a small number of causes.  (cf. Farrington 1949, p. 110.)
^4	  Hacking’s objections to Feyerabend for indiscriminately lumping together different kinds of scientific statements suggest that he would not sanction such a move (174).
^5	  “The analogy that suggests itself is that in mathematics demonstration is easy and clear when the machine is used (astante machina); whereas without this convenience everything seems complicated and more subtle than it really is” (J&S trans. NO-plan, p. 23).
